We construct an LWE-based key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme that supports attributes of unbounded polynomial length. Namely, the size of the public parameters is a fixed polynomial in the security parameter and a depth bound, and with these fixed length parameters, one can encrypt attributes of arbitrary length. Similarly, any polynomial size circuit that adheres to the depth bound can be used as the policy circuit regardless of its input length (recall that a depth d circuit can have as many as 2 d inputs). This is in contrast to previous LWE-based schemes where the length of the public parameters has to grow linearly with the maximal attribute length.
We believe that our techniques are of interest at least as much as our end result. Fundamentally, selective security and bounded attributes are both shortcomings that arise out of the current LWE proof techniques that program the challenge attributes into the public parameters. The LWE toolbox we develop in this work allows us to delay this programming. In a nutshell, the new tools include a way to generate an a-priori unbounded sequence of LWE matrices, and have fine-grained control over which trapdoor is embedded in each and every one of them, all with succinct representation.
Introduction
The second shortcoming of the circuit-ABE constructions based on lattices and LWE is that they are only selectively secure. Selective security means that the attacker needs to decide which challenge attribute to attack before seeing the public parameters of the scheme or any of the keys. In adaptive security (also known as full security), the challenge attribute x * can be chosen at any point, even depending on the public parameters and decryption keys obtained by the attacker.
While we do know of adaptively secure ABE for formulas [LOS + 10] based on bilinear maps, and for circuits based on multilinear maps [GGHZ14] and on indistinguishability obfuscation [Wat15] , achieving adaptive security in LWE-based constructions seems to require fundamentally new ideas. Recently, Ananth, Brakerski, Segev and Vaikuntanathan [ABSV15] came up with a generic way to go from selective to adaptive security for (collusion-resistant) FE schemes, but their transformation does not work for ABE schemes.
A well known "hack" for getting around the selectiveness issue is to use "complexity leveraging". This technique is based on the observation that an adaptive adversary can be made selective at the cost of a factor 2 increase in the running time (or loss of 2 − in the success probability), where is the maximum attribute length, just by guessing the challenge attribute ahead of time. Therefore, if we start with a selective scheme that is secure against 2 · poly(λ) adversaries, then it is also adaptively secure against poly(λ) time adversaries. Since usually = poly(λ), this method leads to a considerable increase in security parameter. More importantly in our situation, if the attribute space is a-priori unbounded, then complexity leveraging cannot work at all.
An intermediate milestone to adaptively secure ABE is the weaker notion of semi-adaptive security, introduced by Chen and Wee [CW14] . Semi-adaptive security permits an adversary to choose the challenge attributes after it sees the public parameters, but before it sees the answers to any of its secret-key queries. Chen and Wee show a simpler construction of adaptively secure ABE for formulas. Note that for unbounded attributes, complexity leveraging is of no use for this notion as well.
Q2:
Is there an adaptively (or even semi-adaptively) secure ABE for general circuits under standard complexity assumptions?
We resolve the first question and (semi-)resolve the second, as follows. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assuming the (polynomial) hardness of approximating worst-case lattice problems to within sub-exponential factor, there is a semi-adaptively secure ABE scheme for circuits of a-priori bounded (polynomial) depth which supports attributes of unbounded length.
In particular, the setup procedure of our scheme does not require an upper bound on the length of the attributes that will be encrypted. Quite curiously, semi-adaptivity in our result seems to come for free from our techniques to achieve unbounded attribute ABE. We elaborate more on our techniques below.
Overview of Our Techniques
We start with an interpretation of the ABE scheme of Boneh et al. [BGG + 14] (itself based on the homomorphic encryption scheme of Gentry, Sahai and Waters [GSW13] ) which will be instrumental for our presentation.
Given matrices C 1 , . . . , C of appropriate dimension, and a function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, represented as a Boolean circuit, one can compute a matrix C f which is the "homomorphic evaluation" of f on {C i }. The property of C f is that for all x ∈ {0, 1} there exists a low-norm matrix H = H C,f,x (that is, one with "fairly small" entries, the exact amplitude depends on the depth of f and does not matter for this high level description) for which
The matrix G is a special "gadget matrix". This means that if C i = AR i + x i G for some low-norm matrix R i , then C f can be expressed as AR f + f (x)G for a somewhat low-norm matrix R f .
In the ABE scheme of Boneh et al. [BGG + 14] , the public parameters contain a matrix A and a set C = (C 1 , . . . , C ) so that is the length of supported attributes. The parameters are chosen so that a secret trapdoor can always find a low norm solution R to any equation of the form C = AR + yG, for all C, y. Encrypting a message to an attribute x is done (at a high level) by considering [A C−x G] as a public key to a dual-Regev encryption scheme [GPV08] and encrypting relative to this key. An important feature of dual-Regev is that it is possible to modify a ciphertext which was encrypted with respect to a certain public key into one that is encrypted with respect to a related key, so long as the new key is obtained by multiplying the old key by a low-norm matrix. Therefore, given some function f , the ciphertext can be converted into one that corresponds to the public key [A C f − f (x)G]. Indeed, ABE secret-keys sk f are generated as dual-Regev keys for the public key [A C f ], and indeed they can decrypt whenever f (x) = 0. 3 In the proof of security, A is generated without a trapdoor, but C i are generated as AR i + x * i G (which is indistinguishable from their honest distribution). This means that whenever f (x * ) = 1, the matrix [A C f ] equals to [A AR f + G]. It had been shown by [ABB10b, MP12] that if R f is known, then dual-Regev keys can be generated even without a trapdoor. Finally, the challenge ciphertext is encrypted relative to [A C − x * G] = A · [I R], which can be shown to be LWE-hard to break if a trapdoor for A is not known (which indeed it isn't).
The absolutely vital technique that makes the proof of [BGG + 14] work 4 is the ability to embed the challenge attributes into the public parameters. It is apparent from this description that the [BGG + 14] scheme is inherently selectively secure and attribute length bounded. It is important that in the security proof, the values of C i are set ahead of time to the right values according to the challenge attributes x * , making the proof inherently selectively secure. In fact, the entire paradigm of embedding the challenge ciphertext in the public parameters necessitates, for pure information-theoretic reasons, that the public parameters grow with the length of the challenge attribute.
The first thing that we should do if we want to stretch the [BGG + 14] scheme to support unbounded length attributes, is to find a way to generate an unbounded number of C i matrices out of a-priori bounded public parameters. Our first observation is that the scheme already exhibits a similar feature in a different context. Namely, the generation of many C f out of a bounded number of C i . Indeed, in our scheme, the public parameters will contain A and a sequence of matrices B. We will consider a predefined and public sequence of functions φ i , where i = 1, 2, . . ., and let C i be the output of homomorphic evaluation of φ i on B. Thus, the scheme already allows us to generate exponentially many matrices out of a few.
This allows us to extend the functionality of the scheme to unbounded attribute length, but only syntactically, since the proof does not extend to this setting. In particular, if we try to program the matrices B in the proof similarly to C from previous works, we can set B i = AR i + σ i G for some string σ. If we do so, we will get that C i = AR φ i + φ i (σ)G, where R φ i is low-norm and can be computed out of the R i matrices. On the one hand, this is quite encouraging since it is not too far from what we need, if only there was a way to define φ i and σ so that φ i (σ) = x * i (the ith bit of the challenge attribute) we would be in business. On the other hand, this is of course impossible for mere information theoretic reasons, since the φ i are public functions and σ has bounded length, so they cannot encode an x * of arbitrary length. Let us therefore take a step back and think, as an intermediate step, about a restricted security model where x * is chosen randomly and not adversarially (except its length, which is still under the adversary's control). Indeed, a random x * cannot be compressed, but in the proof of security we can swap x * for a pseudorandom value that can be easily expressible as the output of a pseudorandom function. In particular, we define φ i (σ) = PRF σ (i) for some pseudorandom function family. For a random seed σ, letting x * i = PRF σ (i) will be indistinguishable from a random value, and will allow us to support random unbounded length attributes using the proof methods from above.
Indeed, we managed to hack the framework into producing an arbitrarily long sequence of C i in such a way that each C i encodes a trapdoor that corresponds to x * i . We view this as an interesting contribution by itself. However, we would like to support adversarially chosen attributes, and not just random ones. To do this, we will show how to "program" the challenge attribute into the PRF values after the fact. In particular, consider, as a mental experiment, an infinite string ∆ which is defined such that ∆ i = x * i ⊕ PRF σ (i). This string is pseudorandom to the adversary, but combining it with the PRF key σ, it contains the information about x * . What we do in the proof, is generate decryption keys for functions f ∆ (x) = f (x ⊕ ∆), instead of for f itself. This needs to be offset by changing the encryption algorithm to encrypt to x ⊕ ∆ rather than to x itself (which might seem impossible at this point, however see below). If we are able to offset our ciphertext, then the challenge ciphertext will now be encrypted respective to x * ⊕ ∆ which is just our PRF value. All of this is done without the adversary noticing anything, because ∆ just seems to him as a completely random string that does not depend on x * .
We are left with two problems. The first and easier one is that ∆ needs to be publicly known, but it has unlimited size and in the proof, we need to know x * in order to generate it. This is easily managed by noticing that only the -prefix of ∆ is needed in order to use a secret key for a function with -bit input. We will therefore append the appropriate prefix of ∆ to any key that we release. This means that we only need to know the value of ∆ when we answer key queries and not when we generate the public parameters. This very fact allows us to achieve semi-adaptive security, where x * can be specified after the setup phase but before key generation. We note that of course setting ∆ respective to x * is only done in the proof. In the real scheme ∆ is a random (or pseudorandom) string that is maintained by the key authority and whose prefixes are released as needed (it is important that the same ∆ is used for all keys). A savvy reader would have noticed that this "delayed" definition of ∆ is similar to non-committing proof techniques which, looking back, is not too surprising. It is also not hard to observe why this technique stops at semi-adaptive security: we managed to postpone defining ∆ to the time when we generate the first secret key. Since ∆ depends on x * in the proof, we are restricted to the semi-adaptive world where all secret-key queries come after the challenge attributes have been declared.
The second and harder problem is how to encrypt in this brave new scheme. The encryption attribute needs to offset for the effect of ∆ on the key, but ∆ itself is not (and must not be) a part of the public parameters and is thus unknown to the encryption algorithm. This problem is solved by showing that we can encrypt for all possible values of ∆ at the same time. Recall that in the encryption, we consider the matrices C i − x i G, for all i. In fact, the encryption process generates a piece of the ciphertext out of each of these matrices, and the collection of pieces constitutes the entire ciphertext. In order to allow for any possible value of ∆, we will generate a ciphertext piece c i,0 for C i − x i G (accounting for ∆ i = 0) and a piece c i,1 for C i − (x i ⊕ 1)G (accounting for ∆ i = 1). This would allow us to take the relevant pieces and use them in the decryption process. Alas, the security of the [BGG + 14] scheme shatters completely if the adversary is allowed to see encryption pieces relative to both C i and C i − G. It appears that we fixed functionality at the expense of security.
Our last technical contribution is to solve this problem by using . . . attribute based encryption! (in fact, even identity based encryption would suffice, but with slightly worse parameters). As a part of our public parameters, we include parameters for a "small" ABE scheme that only needs to support bounded short attributes and low depth circuits. We will encrypt the ciphertext piece c i,b with respect to attribute (i, b) using the "small" scheme. Then, as a part of the functional key, we will also produce a "small" key that will allow to decrypt only attributes (i, b) for which b = ∆ i . This means that an adversary can only see those ciphertext pieces that are needed for decryption. Furthermore, since the offset ∆ is fixed, the adversary will only ever see c i,0 or c i,1 but not both, thus keeping security in tact. This completes the description of our scheme.
Preliminaries

Bounded Distributions and Swallowing
As in many previous works based on LWE, we will rely heavily on distributions that are supported over a bounded domain (with high probability). We will also rely on the fact that some distributions (e.g. sufficiently wide Gaussians) remain almost unchanged under small shifts. Formal definitions follow. The following is a straightforward application of the properties of rounded/discrete Gaussians.
Fact 2.1. For every B, , δ there exists an efficiently sampleable distribution that is both (B, )-swallowing and (B · log(1/δ)/ , O(δ))-bounded.
Finally, we will define the notion of a distribution that is swallowing with respect to another. Definition 2.3. A distributionχ supported over Z is (χ, )-swallowing, for a distribution χ, if it holds thatχ and χ +χ are within statistical distance. We omit the when it indicates a negligible function in a security parameter that is clear from the context.
The following corollary summarizes the swallowing properties required for our scheme.
Corollary 2.2. Let B(λ) be some function and letB(λ) = B(λ) · λ ω(1) , then there exists an efficiently sampleable ensemble {χ λ } λ such thatχ is χ-swallowing for any B(λ)-bounded {χ λ } λ , and alsoB(λ)-bounded.
Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function family is a pair of ppt algorithms PRF = (PRF.Gen, PRF.Eval), such that the key generation PRF.Gen(1 λ ) takes as input the security parameter, and outputs a seed σ ∈ {0, 1} η (where η = η λ is the key length). The evaluation algorithm PRF.Eval(σ, x) takes a seed σ ∈ {0, 1} η and in input x ∈ {0, 1} * and returns a bit y ∈ {0, 1}. Definition 2.4. A family PRF as above is secure if for every polynomial time adversary A it holds that
where σ = PRF.Gen(1 λ ) and O is a random oracle. The probabilities are taken over all of the randomness of the experiment.
KP-ABE with Unbounded Attribute Length
Let F = {F λ } λ be an ensemble of function classes such that F λ ⊆ {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. We assume that the functions are represented as boolean circuits. A key-policy attribute based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme is defined by a tuple of ppt algorithms ABE = (ABE.Params, ABE.Enc, ABE.Keygen, ABE.Dec) such that:
• The setup algorithm ABE.Params(1 λ ) takes the security parameter as input and outputs a master secret key msk and a set of public parameters pp.
• The encryption algorithm ABE.Enc pp (µ, x) uses the public parameters pp and takes as input a message µ from a message space M = M λ and an attribute x ∈ {0, 1} * . It outputs a ciphertext ct ∈ {0, 1} * .
• The key generation algorithm ABE.Keygen msk (f ) uses the master secret key msk and takes as input a function f ∈ F λ . It outputs a secret key sk f .
• The decryption algorithm ABE.Dec pp (sk f , x, ct) takes as input a function secret key sk f , an attribute x ∈ {0, 1} * and a ciphertext ct, and outputs a message µ ∈ M.
Definition 2.5 (Correctness of KP-ABE). A scheme ABE is correct if the following holds. Consider a sequence of functions {f λ ∈ F λ } λ and a sequence of attributes {x λ ∈ {0, 1} * } λ , such that for all λ, the input size of f is exactly |x λ | and f λ (x λ ) = 0. 5 For all such sequences and for any sequence {m λ ∈ M λ } λ , it holds that
Definition 2.6 (Security for KP-ABE). Let ABE be a KP-ABE encryption scheme as above, and consider the following game between the challenger and adversary.
1. The challenger generates (msk, pp) = ABE.Params(1 λ ), and sends pp to the adversary.
5 Recall our convention that f (x) = 0 is the event when decryption succeeds.
2. The adversary makes arbitrarily many key queries by sending functions f i (represented as circuits) to the challenger. Upon receiving such function, the challenger creates sk i = ABE.Keygen msk (f i ) and sends sk i to the adversary.
3. The adversary sends an attribute x * and a pair of messages m 0 , m 1 to the challenger. The challenger samples b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext ct * = ABE.Enc pp (m b , x). It sends ct * to the adversary.
4. The adversary makes arbitrarily many key queries as in Step 2 above.
5. The adversary outputsb ∈ {0, 1}.
6. Let legal denotes the event where all key queries of the adversary are such that f i (x * ) = 1. If legal, the output of the game is b =b, otherwise the output b is a uniformly random bit.
The advantage of an adversary A is |Pr[b = b] − 1/2|, where b, b are generated in the game played between the challenger and the adversary A(1 λ ). If x * is too short or too long compared to the prescribed input size of f i then it is truncated or padded with zeros appropriately (see discussion below). The game above is called the adaptive security game for ABE, and it has relaxed variants. In the selective security game, the adversary sends x * before Step 1. In the semi-adaptive security game, the adversary sends x * before Step 2.
The scheme ABE is adaptively/selectively/semi-adaptively secure if any ppt adversary A only has negligible advantage in the adaptive/selective/semi-adaptive security game (respectively).
Negated Policies. We allow decryption when f (x) = 0 and require that in the security game all queries are such that f (x * ) = 1. In LWE-based constructions it is often much more convenient to work with this negated version of the policy, which explains the apparent strangeness. This variant is obviously equivalent.
Discussion. Our definition does not place any restrictions on the attribute length so the only restriction comes from limiting the adversary to run in polynomial time (so it can only output x * and f i that are polynomially bounded). It is important to notice that in this regime, there are no known generic transformations from selective to semi-adaptive to adaptive security, even if we strengthen the hardness assumption. In particular, the complexity leveraging technique, in which the challenger "guesses" x * in the beginning of the experiment, and a sub-exponential hardness assumption is made to account for the success probability of this guess, is no longer applicable. In this light, we view our semi-adaptive security improvement as qualitative rather than quantitative.
Lastly, we note that in the security definition (but not in the correctness requirement!) we chose to allow f (x * ) to be well defined even if there is a mismatch between the input length of f and the length of x * (by truncating x * or padding with zeros). A different valid approach would be to consider an alternate, stronger, definition that if there is a mismatch then f (x * ) = 1 (and thus it is legal for the adversary to query any function that does not have the same input length as |x * |). We notice that this notion of security is derived from ours by adding the length itself to the attribute. More explicitly, when you want to encrypt with attribute x of length , use the ABE scheme with attribute ( , x), and in the key generation process, when you want to generate a key for function f , generate a key for f ( , x) that first checks that is indeed the intended input length. Therefore, using our definition does not limit generality in this aspect.
LWE, Trapdoors, Homomorphism
This section summarizes tools from previous works that are used in our construction. This includes the definition of the LWE problem and its relation to worst case lattice problems, the notion of trapdoors for lattices and operations on trapdoors, and homomorphic evaluation of matrices with special properties.
Learning with Errors (LWE). The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was introduced by
Regev [Reg05] as a generalization of "learning parity with noise" [BFKL93, Ale03] . We now define the decisional version of LWE. (Unless otherwise stated, we will treat all vectors as column vectors in this paper).
Definition 3.1 (Decisional LWE (DLWE) [Reg05] ). Let λ be the security parameter, n = n(λ), m = m(λ), and q = q(λ) be integers and χ = χ(λ) be a probability distribution over Z. The DLWE n,q,χ problem states that for all m = poly(n), letting A ← Z n×m q , s ← Z n q , e ← χ m , and u ← Z m q , the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
There are known quantum (Regev [Reg05] ) and classical (Peikert [Pei09] ) reductions between DLWE n,q,χ and approximating short vector problems in lattices. Specifically, these reductions take χ to be a discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,αq for some α < 1. We write DLWE n,q,α to indicate this instantiation. We now state a corollary of the results of [Reg05, Pei09, MM11, MP12]. These results also extend to additional forms of q (see [MM11, MP12] ).
Corollary 3.1 ( [Reg05, Pei09, MM11, MP12]).
Let q = q(n) ∈ N be either a prime power q = p r , or a product of co-prime numbers q = q i such that for all i, q i = poly(n), and let α ≥ √ n/q. If there is an efficient algorithm that solves the (average-case) DLWE n,q,α problem, then:
• There is an efficient quantum algorithm that solves GapSVP O(n/α) (and SIVP O(n/α) ) on any n-dimensional lattice.
• If in addition q ≥Õ(2 n/2 ), there is an efficient classical algorithm for GapSVPÕ (n/α) on any n-dimensional lattice.
Recall that GapSVP γ is the (promise) problem of distinguishing, given a basis for a lattice and a parameter d, between the case where the lattice has a vector shorter than d, and the case where the lattice doesn't have any vector shorter than γ · d. SIVP is the search problem of finding a set of "short" vectors. The best known algorithms for GapSVP γ ( [Sch87]) require at least 2Ω (n/ log γ) time. We refer the reader to [Reg05, Pei09] for more information.
In this work, we will only consider the case where q ≤ 2 n . Furthermore, the underlying security parameter λ is assumed to be polynomially related to the dimension n.
Lastly, we derive the following corollary which will allow us to choose the LWE parameters for our scheme. The corollary follows immediately from the fact that the discrete Gaussian D Z,αq is (αq · t, 2 −Ω(t 2 ) )-bounded for all t.
Corollary 3.2. For all > 0 there exist functions q = q(n) ≤ 2 n , χ = χ(n) such that χ is B-bounded for some B = B(n), q/B ≥ 2 n and such that DLWE n,q,χ is at least as hard as the classical hardness of GapSVP γ and the quantum hardness of SIVP γ for γ = 2 Ω(n ) .
The Gadget Matrix. Let N = n · log q and define the "gadget matrix" G = g ⊗ I n ∈ Z n×N q where g = (1, 2, 4, . . . , 2 log q −1 ) ∈ Z log. We will also refer to this gadget matrix as the "powers-of-two" matrix. We define the inverse function G −1 : Z n×m q → {0, 1} N ×m which expands each entry a ∈ Z q of the input matrix into a column of size log q consisting of the bits of the binary representation of a. We have the property that for any matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , it holds that
Trapdoors. Let n, m, q ∈ N and consider a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q . For all V ∈ Z n×m q , we let A −1 τ (V) denote the random variable whose distribution is a Gaussian D m Z m ,τ conditioned on A · A −1 τ (V) = V. A τ -trapdoor for A is a procedure that can sample from the distribution A −1 τ (V) in time poly(n, m, m , log q), for any V. We slightly overload notation and denote a τ -trapdoor for A by A −1 τ . The following properties had been established in a long sequence of works. 3. For all A ∈ Z n×m q and R ∈ Z m×N , with N = n log q , one can obtain
4. There exists an efficient procedure TrapEmbed(1 n , q) that outputs (A, A −1 τ 0 ) where A ∈ Z n×m q for some m = O(n log q) and is 2 −n -uniform, where τ 0 = O( √ n log q log n).
Homomorphic Evaluation. Consider some n, q ∈ N. Consider C 1 , . . . , C ∈ Z n×N q where N = n log q , and denote C = [C 1 · · · C ]. Let f be a boolean circuit of depth d computing a function {0, 1} → {0, 1}, and assume that f contains only NAND gates. We define C f = Eval(f, C) recursively: associate C 1 , . . . , C with the input wires of the circuit. For every wire w in f , letting u, v be its predecessors and define C w = G − C u · G −1 (C v ). Finally C f is the matrix associated with the output wire.
Denoting
is independent of R).
Our Scheme
We now present our scheme and prove its correctness and security. As in previous works on LWEbased ABE schemes [GVW13b,BGG + 14], it would be easier for us to work with "negated policies", so that sk f can decrypt ciphertexts with attribute x if f (x) = 0. We start by defining the class of depth bounded circuits, to which our construction is targeted. Next, we define another class of circuits. These are very simple circuits that contain a hardcoded string, and upon receiving an index and bit as input, they check whether the relevant location in the string is indeed the supplied value.
Definition 4.2. Consider the family of circuits {BitCheck ν,x } s.t. for all ν ∈ N and x ∈ {0, 1} * , |x| ≤ 2 ν , we define BitCheck ν,x : [2 ν ] × [2 ν ] × {0, 1} → {0, 1} such that BitCheck ν,x ( , i, b) = 0 if and only if |x| = and also x i = b. Note that BitCheck ν,x can always be computed by a boolean circuit of depth O(log |x|) = O(ν) (we assume that , i are in standard ν-bit binary representation).
The Scheme. Let ν = ν(λ) be any super-logarithmic function (so that 2 ν is super-polynomial). Let oldABE = (oldABE.Params, oldABE.Enc, oldABE.Keygen, oldABE.Dec) be a selectively-secure key-policy ABE scheme for the function class {{BitCheck ν(λ),x : |x| ≤ 2 ν }} λ where ν is as above (i.e. oldABE only need to support bounded length attributes, and furthermore this length can be any super-logarithmic function). Let PRF be a family of pseudorandom functions and let η = η λ be the seed length (for security parameter λ). Let d prf be the depth of PRF.Eval(σ, x) for |x| = ν (by definition d prf = poly(λ)).
We now present our ABE scheme for any class of circuits of a-priori polynomial depth bound. We note that as in previous works, we submit the depth bound as an additional parameter to the setup procedure. In order to support the class P d , the setup procedure is to be executed on input (1 λ , 1 d(λ) ). Finally, the scheme is parameterized by a constant ∈ (0, 1) that determines the tradeoff between the lattice approximation factor on which security is based, and the efficiency of the scheme.
• ABE. Params(1 λ , 1 d ) . We start by setting DLWE parameters based on Corollary 3.2. Let n be s.t. (n 2 +1) 2(d prf +d) ·2 3ν ≤ 2 n . The solution to the equation is of the form n ≤ (λd) O(1/ ) , which is polynomial in the security parameter for any constant . We choose q, χ, B accordingly based on Corollary 3.2, and note that by definition q/B ≥ (N + 1) 2(d prf +d) · 2 3ν (recall that N = n log q ).
We further letχ be a B -swallowing andB-bounded distribution, for B = B · mηN (N + 1) d prf andB = 2 ν · B , whose existence is guaranteed by Corollary 2.2. . We assume w.l.o.g that m ≥ n log q + 2λ (otherwise random padding can be applied). Generate a key pair for oldABE: (oldabemsk, oldabepp) = oldABE.Params(1 λ ). Generate a seed for a PRF σ = PRF.Gen(1 λ ).
Generate a matrix-trapdoor pair (A,
We set msk = (A −1 τ , oldabemsk, σ) and pp = (A, B, oldabepp).
• ABE.Enc pp (µ, x), where pp = (A, B, oldabepp), µ ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ {0, 1} * . We let = |x| denote the length of the attribute string. For all i ∈ [ ], generate C i = Eval(PRF.Eval(·, i), B).
(Where PRF.Eval(·, i) is the circuit that takes a seed σ and outputs PRF.Eval(σ, i).)
This is essentially a dual-Regev encryption of µ under public key A, v. The rest of the ciphertext will contain auxiliary information that will allow to decrypt given a proper functional secret key. Specifically, we sample for all i ∈ [ ] a noise vectorẽ i $ ←χ N , and compute
Finally, the vectors c i,β are encrypted again using the old ABE scheme:
• ABE.Keygen msk (f ). Given a circuit f computing a function {0, 1} → {0, 1}, the key is generated as follows. We recall that we work with negated policies so sk f should decrypt only when f (x) = 0.
For all i, define ∆ i = PRF.Eval(σ, i). Further let ∆ ≤ = ∆ 1 · · · ∆ be the -prefix of the infinite string ∆ (in fact, we can think of ∆ as having length 2 ν , which is finite but super-polynomial).
Generate a key for the old scheme oldabesk = oldABE.Keygen oldabemsk (BitCheck ν,∆ ≤ ). Note that ∆ ≤ and oldabesk depend only on msk and , and not on f , and therefore they can be generated and published once and for all for each value of . Define
• ABE.Dec(sk f , x, ct). Given sk f = (f, ∆ ≤ , oldabesk , t f ), x ∈ {0, 1} such that f (x) = 0, and
, the decryption process runs as follows.
Use oldabesk to compute
and recompose c
We again compute
We also compute H = H f ∆ ,x⊕∆ ≤ , C . Note that by the properties stated above, it holds that 
Correctness
Let {(f λ , x λ )} λ be an arbitrary sequence of function-message pairs s.t. f λ has depth at most d(λ), and |x| ≤ (λ) for some polynomial . Consider properly generated (pp, msk) = ABE.Params(1 λ ), a properly encrypted ciphertext ct = Enc pp (µ, x) for some value µ ∈ {0, 1} and a properly generated functional key sk f = ABE.Keygen msk (f ). Consider the execution of ABE.Dec(sk f , x, ct). The correctness of oldABE implies that with all but negligible probability, the vectors c i,x i ⊕∆ i computed in Eq. (2) are indeed equal to the ones encrypted in Eq. (1). Namely, that
and therefore c
which, recalling that f (x) = 0 and denoting
Finally, we get that
and therefore that
We conclude that we have correct decryption so long as ẽ T H e T e · t f is bounded away from q/4. We will produce a fairly loose bound, since the asymptotic parameters will only be effected marginally. A precise analysis could be obtained using standard techniques. We recall that by the properties of discrete Gaussians, it holds that t f ∞ ≤ τ √ m + N with all but 2 −(m+N ) = negl(λ) probability, and also that asymptotically ≤ 2 ν . Therefore, with all but negligible probability
Since we set q/B ≥ (N + 1) 2(d prf +d) 2 3ν , we get that correctness holds asymptotically for any polynomials (λ), d(λ).
Security
We prove that our scheme is semi-adaptively secure as per Definition 2.6. Our proof heavily relies on the structure of the string ∆. Whereas ∆ has a succinct representation as the output of a PRF, the view of the adversary does not depend on the seed of the PRF in any way except through the bits of ∆. Therefore, it follows from the pseudorandomness property that ∆ is indistinguishable from a completely random string. It follows, therefore, that XORing x * into ∆ will go unnoticed by the adversary. However, this allows us to embed the challenge attribute in the public parameters in an indirect way, namely, now the XOR of the PRF's ith bit with ∆ i is exactly x * i . This means that x * i ⊕ ∆ i = PRF(i) and thus that C i − (x * i ⊕ ∆ i )G is independent of x * itself and therefore can be known to the reduction ahead of time. This will allow us to apply similar techniques to those in [BGG + 14] to prove security. A formal statement of the lemma together with a detailed sketch of the proof follows.
Lemma 4.1. Let PRF be a family of secure pseudorandom functions as per Section 2.2, and let oldABE be a selectively secure ABE scheme for the function class BitCheck ν,x for some superlogarithmic ν = ν(λ). Then under the DLWE n,q,χ assumption, the scheme ABE is a semi-adaptively secure ABE scheme for the function class P d .
Extended sketch. We use * to denote the length of the challenge attribute x * . We also extend the notation x * i as follows: if i ≤ * then x * i denotes the ith bit of x * as usual, however, for i > * our convention is that x * i = 0. The proof follows by a sequence of hybrids. We consider an adversary A for the semi-adaptive security game in Definition 2.6. Let Adv[A] denote the advantage of A in the security game. We will denote by Adv H [A] the advantage of A in the experiment described in hybrid H. Hybrid H 1 . In this hybrid, we change the way the (infinite) string ∆ is defined. Recall that in the previous hybrid, ∆ i = PRF.Eval(σ, i). However in this hybrid and throughout the proof we set
Note that now x * needs to be known in order to compute ∆. However, ∆ is not used at all until the first key query is answered. Therefore, to execute this hybrid, the challenger only needs to know x * before responding to the first key query, which is consistent with semi-adaptive security.
To see why the view of the adversary is indistinguishable in H 1 and H 0 , consider replacing PRF.Eval(σ, i) with an oracle that returns a random bit for every i. In such case, the distributions in both hybrids are identical. Since σ itself is not used anywhere except to generate PRF.Eval(σ, i), the pseudorandomness of PRF guarantees that the views when using PRF.Eval(σ, i) are computationally indistinguishable. We conclude that
We remark that this is the only place where the pseudorandomness of the PRF is used, and from this hybrid and on one can think of σ as public.
Lastly, we notice that since we extended our notation so that x * i = 0 for i > * , we can say that from this hybrid and throughout the proof, it holds that ∆ i = PRF.Eval(σ, i) ⊕ x * i for all i ∈ N.
Hybrid H 4 . In this hybrid, we change the distribution of A and sample it uniformly from Z n×m q rather than via TrapEmbed. Since TrapEmbed samples A which is statistically indistinguishable from uniform, we conclude that the distribution produced in the two hybrids are statistically indistinguishable as well.
Hybrid H 5 . In this hybrid we change the way the challenge ciphertext is computed. Specifically we change the way we compute ψ i,1−∆ i , for all i, and set
where the zero vector has the same length as c i,x * i ⊕∆ i ⊕1 . Since for all , i, BitCheck n,∆ ≤ ( , i, 1 − ∆ i ) = 1, and thus for all , the key oldabesk must not decrypt ψ i,1−∆ i , we would like to use the security of oldABE to argue that H 5 is computationally indistinguishable from H 4 . However, some care needs to be taken since we only assume that oldABE is selectively secure.
The formal proof will proceed via a hybrid argument going over all values of and β (note that we at this point we have an upper bound on given by the running time of A). In the (i, β) hybrid, we change all ciphetexts ψ i ,β such that (i , β ) < (i, β) (lexicographically) to 0 if β = ∆ i . To argue that two adjacent hybrids are indistinguishable, we rely on the selective hardness of oldABE for the fixed attribute (i, β) which can be provided in the beginning of the game as required for selective security.
We conclude that this hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one. Hybrid H 6 . We again change the contents of the challenge ciphertext as follows. We generate s, e, e as before, and set b T = s T A + e T , and b = s T v + e . The vector c 0 is generated identically to before, but we can express it in terms of b, b as
We recall that as of the previous hybrid, the values c i,x * i ⊕∆ i ⊕1 no longer appear in the challenge ciphertext, so they are not generated at all. The only change that we make is in the generation of c i,x * i ⊕∆ i . We recall that in the previous hybrid We note that in this hybrid, given b, b , the challenger does not need to know the values of s, e, e since they are not used directly.
Hybrid H 7 . In the final hybrid, we change the distribution of b, b to be uniform in Z m q , Z q , respectively. Indistinguishability follows by definition from the DLWE n,q,χ assumption. We have |Adv 
Conclusion
Finally we can put all the pieces together and state our result with all parameters.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that GapSVP (respectively SIVP) is hard to approximate by a polynomial time classical (respectively quantum) algorithm to within a factor of 2 n . Then for any polynomial d = d(λ) there exists a correct and semi-adaptively secure ABE scheme for the policy class P d . Letting k = (λd) 1/ , the public parameters of the scheme are of size poly(k), ciphertexts are of length · poly(k), where is the attribute length, and the key length is + poly(k), where is the input length of the policy function (all poly(·) notations indicate a specific polynomial function).
Proof. A secure family of pseudorandom functions can be instantiated based on the existence of any one-way function, and in particular on the hardness of lattice approximation to within poly(n) 2 n factor. We instantiate oldABE using the scheme from [BGG + 14]. Recall that oldABE only needs to support attributes of length O(ν) and policies which can be represented by circuits of depth O(log(ν)). This means that such a scheme can be based on the hardness of DLWE with parameters that translate to the hardness of lattice approximation to within a factor of 2 n o(1) 2 n . The keys and ciphertexts of oldABE will have overhead poly(λ) for a fixed polynomial.
Combining these primitives with the correctness analysis and with the security analysis in Lemma 4.1, the theorem follows.
